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In this paper I have analysed the development of company law from 1720 through to 1857. During 
this long period of time, company law assumed the characteristics it has now. At the starting point, 
company  law  stood  with  incorporation  granted  by  the  Crown  or  Parliament  on  one  side  and 
partnership regulated by common law on the other. The development of the modern corporation 
needed  the  definition  of  what  were  the  problems  connected  to  the  fact  that  a  firm  is  run  in 
association and what is the legal framework that allows to solve efficiently with the lowest costs 
these problems. In this paper I show that the introduction of limited liability gets its meaning from 
the  exact  definition  of  many  other  aspects  of  company  life,  such  as  bankruptcy  procedures, 
directors’  power  and  responsibility,  shareholders  rights,  publicity  regime  for  company  acts. 
Accordingly  it’s  shown  that  the  introduction  of  the  limited  liability  regime  can’t  be  studied  in 
isolation and it was just the last step in a complex development process. 
  
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
In its most stylized tenets the economic theory sees the firm as an institution that buys factors to 
produce goods and services with the objective of obtaining the maximum profit. This completely 
abstract concept of the firm is easily acceptable and it performs a pivotal role in the construction of  
a market model and in the construction of the supply side of an economy. While the development of 
a more detailed and precise definition of the firm proves much harder, it’s nonetheless true that 
modern corporations seem to perform nearly the exact function of the firm. The development of the 
modern corporation as defined by company law has been however a very long process that took 
place  together  with  the  process  of  economic  development  in  the  western  countries.  Economic 
development and the development of economic institutions seem to be two joint processes where 
law gives a general framework for the settlement of concurring interests, and economic activity 
while taking advantage of the opportunities that law provides, it poses new challenges and new 
problems to the law makers.  
  In this paper I examine the evolution of the legal entity forming the joint stock company up to 
the establishment of limited liability in England. 
  The introduction of limited liability in England has been the object of a wide body of studies that 
see  economic history, economic theory  and law developing  a stimulating debate. Smart  (1996) 
suggests that “…any analysis of limited liability must seek to answer two classes of questions. First, 
what were the effect of limited liability legislation on nineteenth-century capital markets? Second, 
why had unlimited liability previously been the norm, and why did the change in liability rules 
occur when it did, in Great Britain  and elsewhere?” (Smart, 1996, 3). Those two are in fact two 
core issues in the debate.  
  The  effect  of  limited  liability  on  the  ownership  structure  of  the  firm  is  connected  with  the 
development of the stock market on theoretical basis (A. Winston, 1993) and on empirical base (C. 
R. Hickson, J. D. Turner, 2003; G. G. Acheson and J. D. Turner, 2004). The reaction of the stock 
market to different liability regimes has been investigated from the empirical point of view (P. Z. 
Grossmann, 1995; C. R. Hickson, J. D. Turner, C. McCann, 2005; M. I. Weinstein, 2003).
1 While 
the market for shares, when established, seems to be fairly indifferent to the companies’ liability 
regime, the establishment of an efficient market for shares seems to be less likely if shares carry 
unlimited liability. The relationship between the introduction of the limited liability regime and the 
development of an organised stock-market is used as an argument in the debate about the timing 
and the success (or lack of success) of it’s introduction in Great Britain.
2 The introduction of limited 
liability is said to have come late, companies are said to have adopted this liability regime slowly 
and these delays, preventing companies from having access to an efficient market for risk capital, 
may have contributed to the economic decline of the United Kingdom. 
  The link between the liability regime and the development of organised stock markets moves 
approximately along these following lines. Shareholders of a company with unlimited liability have 
a very high incentive to monitor not only the behaviour of the managers but the behaviour of the 
other shareholders as well and these activities are costly. Shareholders in a company with limited 
liability have a lower incentive to monitor managers’ behaviour and above all they have no need to 
monitor other shareholders. The absence of the need to monitor other shareholders makes shares 
easily transferable facilitating the establishment of efficient share-markets. Some authors state that 
without limited liability there can’t be a single price for a company share (P.Halpern, M.Trebilcock, 
S.Turnbull, 1980), other authors push the argument further, stating that marketability of ownership  
_____________________ 
1  Grossman  and  Weinstein  do  study  shares’  prices  under  limited  and  unlimited  liability  regimes,  but  they  treat 
proportional liability like unlimited liability. While proportional liability may be unlimited indeed, it is substantially 
different from joint and several unlimited liability. In most theoretical studies, a regime of limited liability is compared 
with a regime of joint and several unlimited liability. 
2 It’s important to notice that Great Britain and England couldn’t be used correctly as equivalent because the same laws 
didn’t always apply to England, Scotland and Ireland. 
    
 
   
solves the agency problem between shareholders and managers (F. H. Easterbrook, D. R. Fischel, 
1985).  
  The  introduction  of  limited  liability  reduces  the  incentive  for  shareholders  to  monitor  the 
management’s behaviour and it transfers risk from shareholders to creditors. Creditors have a higher 
incentive to monitor managers behaviour and that, not only will make worthwhile a higher level of 
monitoring,  but  it  will  allow  the  development  of  agencies  (like  banks)  that  specialise  in  this 
monitoring activity and will be able to perform it at a lower cost. 
The theoretical debate defines the regime of limited liability as a very efficient one but that leaves 
open the question why wasn’t it introduced earlier? A possible answer to this question is suggested 
investigating the possibility that on equity and debt-market adverse selection takes place toward 
limited  liability  companies  so  that  in  the  end  a  limited  liability  regime  is  more  costly  for  the 
company (J. L.Carr, G. F. Matthewson, 1988; K. F. Forbes, 1986). Another possible answer is that 
liability’s restriction is costly and firm’s size determine the ability to either support or to reduce 
these costs (S. Woodward, 1985). 
  In  this  debate  about  the  relationship  between  limited  liability  and  development  of  the  stock 
market and about the timing of the introduction of limited liability in UK, limited liability is seen as 
an aspect of corporate law that may be seen quite in isolation.  
In  the  following  pages,  I’ll  show  how  corporate  law  had  to  go  through  a  long  process  of 
development before the issue of limiting the liability could become a  central one. Historically, 
incorporation that brought with itself limitation of liability, was a regulated legal form that wasn’t 
born  for  business  enterprises  run  by  people  in  association.  Business  enterprises  were  let  to 
partnership and partnership was a common law’s legal form. During the first fifty years of the 
nineteenth  century  a  long  process  took  place  that  saw  the  definition  of  the  legal  status  of  the 
business corporation. While the five incidents of incorporation (to have a common seal, to be able 
to sue and be sued by its corporate name, to have perpetual succession, to make by-laws or private 
statutes for the better government of the corporation, which are binding for its members unless 
contrary to the laws of the land, to buy and hold lands for its benefit) may have had one meaning 
when applied to the Archbishop of Canterbury, they must have had a completely different one when 
applied to a brewery. On the side of common law, partnership proved a quite ineffective framework 
for enterprise. The development of corporate law moved along two lines, on one side incorporation 
was slowly redefined so that it could satisfy business’ need; on the other side single features of 
incorporation were extended to partnership to improve its effectiveness. Both lines of development 
can be seen a search for the legal status that would allow to run joint economic activities with the 
lowest transaction costs and the liability regime seem to be the last step along this line. The fact that 
limited liability was the last step taken, suggests that other aspects of incorporation were more 
useful to make partnership a workable legal status or it could be suggested that other aspects of 
incorporation allowed larger savings. Furthermore the reduction of costs connected with limited 
liability seems to have been not so necessary for the development of the stock market: during the 
first half of the nineteenth century in fact, organised markets developed for assets that were very 
different from shares of a limited liability company. 
 
1.  AB IMMEMORE TO 1720 
In this paragraph I summarize the development of the concept of incorporation up to 1720. I make a 
short  review  of  what  was  the  meaning  of  incorporation  for  English  law  up  to  that  time  and  I 
highlight how the Crown and Parliament were the only two powers that could legally grant it. The 
legislation of 1720 makes in fact clear that incorporation was one special legal status that could not 
be achieved at common law. 
  Broadly speaking,  a joint economic  activity  carried out for  gain,  can currently be organised 
following two main legal types: company and partnership, regulated by two different sets of rules. 
Despite the fact that the word “company” does not have a strict legal meaning per se, the two sets of 
rules  are  now  well  developed  and  allow  a  clear  distinction  between  the  two  legal  types:  
 
   
incorporated companies on one side and unincorporated associations (partnership) on the other. The 
incorporation of a company implies the establishment of a legal entity, which is different from its 
member, and has “legal personality” i.e. it enjoys its own right and it is subject to its own duties 
(Davies, 1989). 
  Starting  from  this  very  general  proposition  it  is  clear  that  the  establishment  of  an  artificial 
persona existing only in contemplation of the law, poses many questions and the following among 
the others: 
-  how does this artificial persona come into existence and how does it cease to exist ? 
-  what powers, capacities and liabilities does this artificial persona have ? 
-  what  is  the  relationship  between  this  artificial  persona  and  the  members  constituting  the 
underlying body of persons ? 
-  what is the relationship between the members of the underlying body and any subject contracting 
with the company ? 
-  how does this artificial persona formulate and enact its choices ? 
  Many sections of company law regulate these aspects. Among the others, company law contains 
provisions on: how to establish a company, what are the organs and officers of a company, what are 
the powers of these organs and their relation, what are the shareholders liabilities, what protection 
shareholders and creditors have, what is the procedure to “wind-up” a company and what are the 
consequences of this procedure (Gower,1979).  
  Following Holdsworth (vol. III, pp.469 ff.), the rules for the creation of an incorporate person 
and the regulation of its activity can be traced back to the Middle Ages. They were developed for 
associations that did not have as their sole or main purpose an economic activity generating profits 
to share among the members, and they were quite well established by the late seventeenth century.  
  It was by then clear (Holdsworth, vol.IX, pp.45 ff.) that the first essential for a valid corporation 
was  a  “lawful  authority  of  incorporation”.  An  authorisation  from  the  state  was  needed,  like  a 
Special Act of Parliament or a Royal Charter
3 which was granted under common  law or under 
statute (Butler,1986).  
  By  the  late  seventeenth  century  it  was  as  well  clear,  that  the  following  five  incidents  were 
inseparably annexed to any corporation 
1. to have a common seal, 
2. to be able to sue and be sued by its corporate name, 
3. to have perpetual succession, 
4. to  make  by-laws  or  private  statutes  for  the  better  government  of  the  corporation,  which  are 
binding for its members unless contrary to the laws of the land, 
5. to buy and hold lands for its benefit. 
 
When, through practice and doctrine, the law had gained sufficient familiarity with the idea of an 
artificial persona, its nature and the implication of its establishment, the possible benefits became 
apparent  of  applying  this  legal  conception  to  associations  having  the  sole  scope  of  running  an 
economic activity for gain. To incorporate a joint economic activity could give many advantages 
because it allowed there to be drawn a clear line between the acts and liabilities of the corporation 
and those of the corporators. For the corporators there could be limited liability
4, the freedom to 
dispose  of  their  share  of  the  activity,  and  the  possibility  to  adopt  majority  decision  rules;  the 
corporation could be a perpetual body, it could act in law and take legal proceedings against third 
parties and against its members (Holdsworth, vol.VIII, pp. 196).  
_____________________ 
3 In earlier times a lawful authority of incorporation would include common law, prescription and in the Middle Ages 
implication. However a progressive limitation of the lawful authority took place and implication, prescription and 
common  law,  never  seem  to  have  had  any  role  in  the  incorporation  of  joint  economic  activities  run  for  gain 
(Holdsworth, ibid) 
4 To have an effective limited liability you need to have adequate accounting procedures to distinguish corporators’ 
from company’s capital accounts. Double entry book-keeping was developed in the fifteenth century Italy and was not 
well known in the British Isles late into the seventeenth century (Cooke, pp.46).  
 
   
  Without a Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament however, incorporation was not possible and it 
was then impossible at common law to obtain simultaneously all the benefit I summarised. An 
unincorporated company could be established by deed, and the deed could contain a wide range of 
provisions about the features of the company, but these provisions were subject to common law. To 
issue shares was possible but it was not clear if these could be freely transferable and in particular 
the benefits of limited personal liability was a crucial feature that could not be achieved at common 
law (Horrwitz,1946). 
  In the late sixteenth and during the seventeenth century, the first incorporated companies were 
established  by  Royal  Charter  or  Act  of  Parliament,  having  as  main  objective  to  undertake  an 
economic activity for gain using a joint stock.
5 The Russia Company was incorporated by Royal 
Charter in 1554, the Levant Company in 1581 (with a temporary charter, a permanent one following 
in 1605), the Virginia Company in 1606 (two other charters followed in 1609 and 1612), the Africa 
Company in 1618 (obtaining three following charters in 1631, 1662 and 1672) just to mention a few 
of the oldest, but I should mention for their relevance the Bank of England, established by charter in 
1694,  the  (Hollow)  Sword  Blade  Company  chartered  in  1691  and  the  South  Sea  Company 
incorporated in 1711. Joint stock companies were incorporated that were operating in almost any 
sector:  foreign  trade,  banks,  utilities,  insurance,  mines,  plantations,  iron  and  steel,  industrials 
(Formoy, 1923 pp. 16 ff.). In any case their establishment was associated with the concession of 
some privilege from the state: some form of monopoly
6 was the most common, but patent letter was 
another and for the earlier companies involved in foreign trade the power of a company to rule over 
its member was de facto extended to non members (e.g. the East India Company, Cooke pp.60; or 
the Hudson’s Bay Company; Holdsworth vol.VIII, pp.210).  
  This first wave of incorporations highlights that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
status of incorporated joint stock company was a privileged one. There was no right to obtain 
incorporation, this was granted on a case by case basis by the Parliament or the Crown within their 
legal power.
7 Incorporation was a privilege to be acquired in a formal, possibly complicated, almost 
certainly expensive way, but not out of reach.
8 
  This first wave of incorporations was followed within a relatively short period of time by one of 
the first bubbles (if not the first bubble) of the stock market
9: the so-called South Sea Bubble. The 
_____________________ 
5 Charters were granted to newly established companies and to unincorporated companies already existing  and created 
by deed of co-partnership (e.g. Mines Royal). 
6 By the seventeenth century it was clear that an Act of Parliament could give corporations any power, and above all 
those powers that without such authority would infringe common law; but it was clear as well that the law could not be 
changed by Royal Charter: a Charter granting powers going against the principles of common law would have been 
void (Holdsworth vol.IX, pp.48). The concession of monopolies had to be done within the boundries of the relative 
legislation (early statutes on monopoly date back to 1623). Sometimes a parliamentary Act was passed first, extending 
the powers of the Crown, and then the Crown could issue a Charter granting monopoly (e.g. the incorporation of the 
Bank of England). 
7 The reasons way the State granted this privilege and what type of consideration was made in assessing each case may 
be investigated and have been investigated from a political, legal, historical and economical point of view. From this 
last point of view it can be argued that the State would grant this privilege to private citizens in view of some gain for 
himself.  In  the  case  of  incorporation  for  companies  involved  in  foreign  trade  the  gain  for  the  State  could  be  an 
expansion abroad of his power. In the case of the Bank of England and the South Sea Company, the companies were 
established to  improve the management of the national debt and the gain for the state is self evident. Less evident is the 
gain for the State deriving from the incorporation of a “Company interested in the  Manufacture and Invention of Milled 
Lead, a small company dividend in only twelve shares, which obtained and Act of Parliament in 1670” (Cooke, pp.20). 
Following Patterson and Reiffen (1990) the State was anyway extracting revenues from the concession of a privileged 
status, and the policy of granting Charters and Private Bills could be analysed in tem of a monopolist (the State) 
maximising its revenue from the “sale” of a privilege. 
8 W.R. Scott gives an estimate of 150 companies existing already in1695 (Scott,vol.1, pp.327 ff.).
 
9  For  a  short  illustration  of  the  organisation  of  the  stock  marker  in  London  in  the  eighteenth  century  see 
S.R.Cope(1978), or the first chapter in R.Michie (1999). 
  
 
   
literature covering the early development of the English financial market could not avoid dealing 
with the now famous bubble. Its possible causes and consequences have been studied in a wide 
body of studies
10 and economic historians have shown that the overoptimistic mood of the stock 
market in 1719 and early 1720 was accompanied by an explosion companies’ promotions.
11 An 
event simultaneous to that bubble but less publicised in the economic literature, is the introduction 
on June the 11
th 1720 of the “Bubble Act”
a. When the prices bubble was peaking, the Parliament 
intervened, either to protect the public and to protect “trade and commerce”, as stated in the official 
documents, or to make amendment for the improper behaviour of the government and some of its 
own members (Holdsworth,VIII,pp.219), or to preserve its ability to extract revenues (Patterson and 
Reiffen,1990). In the Bubble Act  
-  generically defined undertakings tending to create prejudice of the public trade and commerce 
and inconvenience to His Majesty’s subjects were deemed to be illegal; 
-  a short list was included of what could have been such undertakings or their insignia: opening 
books for public subscription, presuming to act as a corporate body,  pretending to make stock 
transferable, pretending to act under obsolete charters;  
-  penalties were introduced for brokers
12 dealing in shares of the illegal undertakings;  
-  and last undertakings established before the 24
th of June 1718 were exempted from the Act and 
they were left under common law.  
  The act may have been poorly drafted to the point of obscurity, but: it made clear that trading in 
shares of unincorporated companies was illegal and implicitly freely transferable shares were a 
privilege belonging to corporations (Holdsworth,VIII pp.220). The act projected then a long lasting 
shadow of illegality on unincorporated companies. 
  
2.  FROM 1720 TO 1844 
In this paragraph I summarize the development company law from 1720 to 1844. During this period 
it became evident that having common law on one side and incorporation by the State on the other 
was a situation unsuitable for a country experiencing the thrust of the industrial revolution. During 
this period legislation evolved introducing legal forms that were intermediate between common law 
company and corporation, giving common rules for the privileges that State and Parliament could 
grant, and introducing the Board of Trade as the authority competent for the administration of these 
privileges. 
  The  Bubble  Act  remained  on  the  statute  book  from  June  1720  till  May  1825,  when  it  was 
repealed 
b. During this long period, so crucial to the economic development of the United Kingdom, 
the law regulating associations carrying on a trade for profit had on one side the privileged status of 
incorporated joint stock company authorised by the State, and on the other side the unincorporated 
company regulated by common law. How similar and how different the two types of organisation 
could and should be, was not clear partly because the Bubble Act, that sanctioned the distinction 
(and created heavy penalties which discouraged tests of the law), was in itself unintelligible and 
partly because the Parliament could and did create intermediate legal forms by special legislation 
and private bills (Shannon, 1931).  
  At common law companies were partnerships and partnership was based on the principle of 
agency. The lack of legal personality and the principle of agency did not allow the drawing of a neat 
distinction between the acts of the company and those of the partners, so there were many problems 
if  this  formula  was  adopted  for  an  economic  enterprise  exceeding  the  small  scale.  Among  the 
others,  there  were  problems:  to  limit  liability,  to  allow  free  transferability  of  shares,  to  solve 
controversies between partners, and to be active or passive subject of legal action. This last was a 
_____________________ 
10 For a short analysis see P.M.Garber (1990). 
11 W.R. Scott reports that 190 companies’ promotion can be identified in the year September 1719 to August 1720 
(Scott, vol.3, pp. 445-458.). 
12 The broker profession was already regulated by law. Earlier rules date back to 1696-1697 (8 and 9 William III, c.32). 
Further Acts will then be passed in 1733 (7 Geo, II c.8) and 1767 (7 Geo III, c.48) (Formoy, pp.10)  
 
   
particularly important problem because, to sue a partnership, the plaintiff must sue all its members. 
The plaintiff himself could not therefore be a member of the partnership, as it is not possible to be 
plaintiff  and  defendant  at  the  same  time.
13  The  practical  impossibility  to  act  against  a  large 
partnership could then be used as an argument to qualify it as illegal, at least in the opinion of the 
Lord Chancellor Lord Eldon (Cooke, 1950, pp.99). These problems were solved as far as possible 
by establishing the company by carefully drafted deed of settlement (Farrar & Al.,1991, pp.23), by 
a further development of the trust formula that already existed at common law (DuBois,1938,Ch.III) 
and by private legislation conferring to unincorporated companies some of the privileges belonging 
to incorporation (Butler, 1986). 
  What could be achieved by the use of deeds of settlement was however limited by the fact that 
these by-laws were binding only for the partners subscribing them and not for third parties, except 
under very special circumstances. A partner liability for example could be limited to a certain extent 
towards the co-partners but in general this limit could not be enforced against third parties; only if a 
third party knew of this liability’s limit there were some chances of making it effective against it. 
  Problems could arise between company and partners due to the fact that a person became a 
partner,  with  rights  and  duties  toward  the  company,  only  when  he  had  subscribed  the  deed  of 
settlement. Because of that the establishment of an unincorporated company could run sometimes 
into difficulties in its earlier stages. To establish a company rising capital from a large number of 
partners, the following procedure seems to have been sometimes used (Formoy, 1923,pp.42 ff.): on 
application  to  the  promoters,  a  future  partner  received  a  letter  of  allotment,  with  the  letter  of 
allotment he deposited at the company’s bank what fraction of the nominal capital was stated and he 
received  in  exchange  a  receipt,  with  this  receipt  the  subscriber  obtained  from  the  company’s 
directors a script certificate and with the script certificate the future partners could sign the deed of 
settlement and obtained in exchange the share certificate. To make the subscription more attractive 
the initial deposit was limited to a small fraction of the share nominal value and letter of allotment, 
bank receipt and script certificate were all transferable. That had two relevant implications: first 
there could have been no relation between the person that originally applied and the person that in 
the end became a true shareholders; second but more important the bank receipt and above all the 
script certificate would  have  given the bearer the right to subscribe the deed  and to become  a 
partner, but it would have conveyed obligations toward the company that were enforceable only 
after the script holder had signed the deed. If the expectations about the company had changed for 
worst, the bearer of a script certificate, issued possibly for a fraction of the capital nominal value, 
could always choose not to subscribe the deed and then not have the shares. The script bearer would 
have forfeited what he paid, possibly net of the deposit that he could reclaim, and not having signed 
the deed he would have been free from obligations toward the company. The company on the other 
side would have had not power to call on him neither for further capital contribution nor for the full 
capital subscription, if that was the case, a troublesome end of the company would have followed. 
  Which legal form to adopt for an economic activity based on a joint stock enterprise was a matter 
for the partners to decide. Incorporation by Royal Charter (with its incidents) with its associated 
procedures, seems to have been difficult and expensive to obtain after the passing of the Bubble Act 
so this form of incorporation was the least commonly used. Incorporation by private bill was easier 
to obtain and then more common (Dubois, 1938, pp.12.ff); companies needing special privileges or 
powers,  granted  exclusively  by  Parliament,  could  petition  to  obtain  those  together  with 
incorporation.  The  canal  companies  are  a  numerous  example  of  this  case:  they  needed  special 
powers, like the right to buy land, and this was a privilege granted by Parliament, and many of them 
were incorporated.
14 Unincorporated companies could be established by deed of settlement, but the 
provisions contained were not binding for third parties, at least in principle. Unincorporated  
_____________________ 
13 To know who the partners were could be a problem for a plaintiff in the case of a fluctuating body, but Formoy 
(1923, pp.33 ff) illustrates  with a clear example the problems  for a plaintiff to sue a partnership, and for a large 
partnership to sue someone.  
14 Before 1800 more than one hundred canal companies had been founded under Canal Acts (Cooke,1950, pp.92).
  
 
   
companies could however petition the Parliament for special legislation conferring privileges or 
powers and the power to sue (and be sued) in the name of the principal officers was sometimes 
obtained. The trust formula allowed to have a class of partner, the trustees, with special rights and 
duties toward the other partners and third parties. Trusts too could be established by deed, they too 
could petition the Parliament to obtain privileges and special powers, or they could be established 
by private Acts like the turnpike trusts.
15  
  In  the  early  eighteen-twenties,  following  a  period  of  economic  growth,  the  financial  market 
started to grow fast and with this growth another period of optimism, companies’ promotion and 
rising asset prices developed (Hunt, 1935). Like one hundred years before, an explosion in joint 
stock companies promotions accompanied this financial boom, notwithstanding the long shadow of 
the  Bubble  Act  and  notwithstanding  all  the  problems  connected  to  the  use  of  unincorporated 
companies and trusts for large economic activities.
16 The Parliament intervened again. In May 1825 
an act was passed that repealed the Bubble Act, explicitly putting under the rule of common law 
those undertakings that were previously forbidden. The same Repealing Act extended the powers of 
the Crown to grant charters of incorporation to trading companies. It was for the Crown to decide if 
and what limit to set for the corporators’ liability. The Crown could now grant incorporated status 
without the incident of fully limited liability. The Repealing Act separated then incorporation from 
limited liability and that implied that to apply for incorporation didn’t guarantee the achievement of 
limited liability (Cooke, 1950, pp.124).  
  The separation between incorporation and the associated privileges went further with the passing 
of  the  Trading  Companies  Act
c  in  1834.  The  Trading  Companies  Act  stated  that  powers  were 
granted to the Crown for the case of associations which “…. would be inexpedient to incorporate by 
Royal Charter, … although it would be expedient to confer upon such association some of the 
privileges of and incident to corporations created by Royal Charter”. Powers were given to the 
Crown to confer to a company by “Letters Patent” any of the privileges that might be granted by 
incorporation,  either  at  common  law  or  according  to  the  Repealing  Act.  With  the  Trading 
Companies Act, the Crown was now entitled to create a company that was nor a corporation nor a 
partnership. 
  After the passing of the act, a company could obtain a restriction of liability for its members and 
the power to stand in legal proceeding through its clerks and officers both by a Private Bill, to be 
obtained from Parliament, or by Letters Patent, to be obtained from the Crown. Companies had two 
alternative ways to reach the same legal status. Hunt (1969) reports that between 1834 and 1837 
there were about 25 application to the Crown for Letters Patent, with only “three or four” (sic) 
being met with success, while in the 1835 and 1836 a total of 406 Private Bills were submitted to 
Parliament  and  251  were  passed.  The  Crown  seems  to  have  used  extremely  sparingly  its  new 
powers, while Parliament seems to have being both more liberal in its concessions and the option of 
choice for companies seeking those two privileges.  
  Another  two  points  of  this  act  are  worthy  mentioning:  publicity  was  introduced  for  the 
concession of the privileges; past shareholders’ liability was explicitly taken into consideration. 
This act prescribed that publicity should be given before any privilege could be effective and the 
same act prescribed a regime of publicity for the content of the Letters Patent. The grant, the names 
of principal clerks and  officers were to be registered in the Office of  the clerk of patents and 
available to the public. Execution against a shareholder could not be obtained three years after he 
transferred his shares (Evans, 1908 [a]). 
_____________________ 
15 The Turnpike Acts gave these bodies some features of the incorporated companies, like to be permanent and to have 
its own funds. The concomitance of: permanent succession, well distinguished assets, partners having greater rights and 
heavier duties and a founding Act of Parliament, made these trusts very similar to incorporated companies which they 
were not. The use of this formula became so widely used that Parliament passed a series of general Acts on this subject 
and in 1773 the General Turnpike Act (13 Geo III, c 84) (Cooke,1950,pp.86 ff.).
 
16 Smart (1912, vol II, pp.295) reports an estimate of 276 companies issuing shares between 1824 and 1825. Cooke 
(1950,pg 102,ff.) reports that 250 private bills concerning companies were in Parliament and that 600 companies issued 
prospects between 1824 and 1825.  
 
   
  During the years immediately following the passing of this act a further wave of companies’ 
promotions followed, mainly led by railway companies, and the unsatisfactory state of the situation 
was highlighted.
17 
  Companies could be partnerships at common law or incorporated or they could have a quasi-
corporate status obtained either by Parliament or the Crown. The Crown could grant incorporation 
by Royal Charter or privileges by Letters Patent, Parliament could grant incorporation, privileges 
and further rights by Private bill. In any case the state was called to take position about the best 
legal framework for a specific economic enterprise but its position could be misinterpreted as a 
judgement about the merit of the underlying project. 
  Each company applying for incorporation or other privileges either to Parliament or the Crown 
would be judged on a case by case basis and each Private bill, Charter or Letters Patent was a 
unique set of rules that applied only to the company which obtained it. 
  A slight but relevant step to amend the situation was the Chartered Companies Act “An act for 
better  enabling  Her  Majesty  to  confer  certain  powers  and  immunities  on  trading  and  other 
companies” passed on the 17
th of July 1837
d. This act repealed the Trading Companies Act, the part 
of the Repealing Act conferring to the Crown the power to grant charters without fully limited 
liability. The same powers were then conferred again to the Crown, but many more details were 
given about the features of Letters Patent, the publicity regime, the content of the company’s deed, 
shareholders liability and rights, the mechanic of shares’ transfers and finally the administration of 
the act was a matter for the Board of Trade. According to this act: 
-  there were prescriptions about the content of the deed of settlement; 
-  the grant of the Letters Patent was to be registered with the Enrolment Office of the Court of 
Chancery together with details about the company. These details included liability’s limit and a list 
of the shareholders stating the number of shares held, the amount paid by the shareholders or repaid 
to them by the company; 
-  the shareholder’s liability was now to cease with the transfer of its shares, but only when this 
transfer was registered with the Enrolment Office. Execution could be taken against shareholders 
when a judgement was obtained against the officers and shareholders could then reclaim the amount 
from the company. Notice further that under this act the shareholder’s right to dividends did cease 
only when the transfer of its shares was registered; 
-  application for Letters Patent was to be advertised both in the London Gazette and in newspapers 
published in the area where the company had its main place of business. 
The same act granted furthermore the power to the crown to incorporate companies for a fixed term. 
  The Act of 1837 made little change to the legal status of the company, but it spelled out some 
elements that were relevant for the further development of the company law: the Board of Trade 
was competent on the matter, application for the privileges was to follow a minimum standard form, 
there was to be a regime of publicity for companies acts, shareholders rights and liabilities were 
linked to the respect of a publicity regime (Holdsworth, vol. XV, pp.45, Formoy pp.57, Cooke 
pp.129). 
 
3.  MAJOR CHANGES IN THE MID 1840’S  
In  this  paragraph  I  describe  the  changes  in  company’s  law  that  took  place  in  the  first  half  of 
eighteen-forties. During this period company law underwent major changes. While incorporation 
remained in the domain of the privileges that the State could grant, trading companies could achieve 
“quasi  incorporation”  (incorporation  without  the  benefit  of  limited  liability)  simply  via  an 
administrative process. The development of company law was however very comprehensive and it 
saw  a  systematic  redrafting  of  the  legislation  that  deals  not  only  with  the  establishment  of  a 
company but with its dissolution or winding-up as well and via the issue of laws aiming at an 
_____________________ 
17 Hunt (1969) referring to the parliamentary “Report of The Selected Committee on Joint Stock Companies, VII 1844”, 
produces  and  estimate  of  300  company  promotions  in  the  period  1834-1836.  The  total  nominal  capital  of  these 
companies was £135,248,500 and railways accounted for nearly £70 millions.  
 
   
harmonisation of the legal features of all existing companies. 
  During the mid twenties and mid thirties of the eighteen century, close in time with the approval 
of the new legislation dealing with the companies’ legal status, the financial market experienced 
two  speculative  bubbles.  The  later  one  was  closely  linked  with  the  growth  and  success  of  the 
railways’ sector because the existing railways were very profitable and prices for their shares grew 
rapidly.  High  dividends  and  capital  gains  of  the  existing  railways  companies  prompted  large 
outbursts of railway companies promotions but companies’ promotion involved other sectors as 
well.  Kostal  (1994)  gives  a  detailed  description  of  the  railways’  promotions.  Following  his 
description the mechanic of these promotions wasn’t very different from the promotion I described 
above: in most cases subscribers were first issued with scripts that were transferable and actively 
traded on the market. The script was not any form of share of an existing company but just a receipt 
giving some form of right to become shareholders when a company was eventually to come to 
existence.
18 The collapse of a project left open a problem of liability which was extremely difficult 
to solve because a promoted company had no legal status on its own. When the bubbles of the mid-
twenties and the mid-thirties burst, a large part of the promoted companies ended their life before 
obtaining a state sanction (Royal Charter, Private Bill or Letters Patent). That brought to the fore the 
problem  of  the  legal  status  of  a  company  that  was  just  promoted  and  not  yet  sanctioned  by 
Parliament or the Crown. 
  The collapse of the mid-thirties’ bubble was amongst the events that prompted the government to 
set  up  in  1841  a  Select  Committee  “to  inquire  into  the  law  respecting  joint  stock  companies 
(banking companies excepted) with a view to the prevention of fraud” (C. A. Cooke, 1950, pp.132). 
This committee published its report in 1844 when another Select Committee, set up to investigate 
railways,  ended  its  work.  The  reports  of  these  two  committees  had  a  major  impact  on  the 
comprehensive  review  of  the  legislation  on  the  joint  stock  companies  that  took  place  in  the 
following years.  
  The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844
e is possibly most important of the eighteen-forties’ acts 
and it represent for many aspects a major change for company law.  
The various acts I considered so far were based on the principle that incorporation was a privilege 
to be granted from the State. The subsequent acts gave the Crown the power to confer some of the 
incorporation  incidents  upon  special  request,  following  its  judgement  and  without  granting 
incorporation  itself.  In  some  respect  incorporation  was  divided  from  its  incidents  and  these 
incidents could then be granted according to the best judgement of Crown and Parliament. The Joint 
Stock Companies Act of 1844 changes completely this framework: without special application to 
the Crown and simply complying with an administrative procedure, incorporation could be obtained 
but for limited liability, that ceased to be a necessary incident of incorporation. 
This act with the definition of its range of application contained a first legal definition of joint stock 
company: ‘every partnership with shares transferable without the consent of the co-partners’ and all 
partnership  with  more  than  twenty-five  members.  The  provisions  of  the  act  did  apply  to  all 
insurance  companies  irrespective  of  their  nature  and  size,  while  banks  and  companies  doing 
parliamentary works (like railways, bridges, waterworks etc.) were excluded.
19 Some non-profit or 
mutual help organisations like schools, literary and scientific institutions, friendly loan and building 
societies were excluded as well. 
  All companies existing before the 1
st of November 1844 had to register within three month of the 
passing of the act, irrespective of them being incorporated by Royal Charter or act of Parliament, or 
them having privileges granted by Letters Patent, or them being established by deed of settlement.  
Registration of these companies didn’t imply that the company was falling under the provision of  
 
_____________________ 
18 Railways and utilities companies needed special powers to complete their undertakings and these companies had to 
apply to Parliament for special legislation. The establishment of a company could then take a fairly long time. 




   
the act, but companies could bring themselves under the act if they so wished.
20 
Shareholders’ liability for the company’s debt was unlimited but execution of a judgement could be 
taken  against  them  only  if  the  company’s  assets  were  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  execution. 
Shareholders were still liable without limits towards company’s creditors, but their liability became 
a  subsidiary  liability  subject  to  unsuccessful  execution  against  the  company’s  assets  (Horrwitz, 
1946). Shareholders’ liability didn’t involve only the current shareholders, but it extended to passed 
one as well. For three years after selling his shares a person remained liable if a company was sued 
over a contract made while he was a shareholder. Shareholders that suffered an execution could 
then find remedy against the company and ask for contribution from other shareholders. 
  The act created the office of the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies that was to administer 
the act and the process of the companies’ registration was defined in a detailed way. Two types of 
registration were created: a provisional and a complete one.  
The  provisional  registration  did  regulate  the  promotion  of  companies’  formations:  minimal 
information about a company and above all its promoters’ names had to be filed with the Registrar 
before the intention to establish the company could be made public. The company could obtain a 
provisional registration that lasted one year but was renewable giving further information about the 
company, including promoters’ details, the written consensus of the formation committee members, 
and prospectuses. When the company had received its provisional registration certificate, it had paid 
a £5 fee, and it had added “registered provisionally” to its name, it could then act in its capacity, 
taking all the necessary steps to come definitely into existence. At this point companies’ promoters 
could open books for subscription accepting a maximum deposit of £0.5 for every £100 of nominal 
capital and the company could apply for Charters, Letters Patent or other private legislation if it was 
needed. 
  Upon filing further information with the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies (copy of the 
deed of settlement, nominal capital, number of shares, names of directors and auditors etc.) and 
proving that the deed has been signed by at least a quarter of the subscribers representing no less 
than a quarter of the nominal capital a company could obtain complete registration. With complete 
registration the company was granted incorporation and all its incidents, except limited liability. 
After receiving complete registration the company should drop “registered provisionally” form its 
name and replace that with “registered”, it had to pay a fee of £5 plus £0.05 for every £1,000 of 
nominal capital declared in the deed and it was then able to begin its life. 
  The act gave guidance about the content of the deed and it spelled out a detailed set of rules for 
the  internal  working  of  the  company  (Evans,  1908  [b]).  In  many  respects  the  act  defined  the 
relationship between management and shareholders and it gave a relevant role to the publicity of the 
companies’ act and to the office of the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies. The act prescribed a 
very modern set of accounting rules: companies had to keep accounts to be audited and balance 
sheets had to be sent to shareholders and to the office of the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies 
together with the auditors’ report.  Interestingly  enough, these rather stringent requirements that 
highlighted the importance of providing shareholders with reliable information about the company 
performance,  were  later  repealed  and  then  reintroduced  only  in  1900  (G.  J.  Benston,  1976). 
Shareholders’  rights  to  dividends  and  vote  were  explicitly  regulated  as  it  was  the  right  of  the 
shareholders to inspect books, register of shareholders, deed and internal regulations. Directors’ 
duties, powers and liability were clearly defined. Sanction from a shareholders’ meeting was needed 
for the use of company’s found to trade in company’s shares, to make loans to directors or officers 
of the company and for contracts made on behalf of the company where directors’ interest could be 
involved. 
_____________________ 
20 A company established before November 1844 could put itself under the umbrella of the act, if its deed of settlement 
complied with the request of the act. If the deed didn’t comply, the act itself granted special powers to the directors of 
these companies so that they could promote and support the needed changes.  
 
   
  Since liability’s transfer was connected with shares’ transfers, the mechanic of this transfer was 
clearly defined and returns of these transfer were to be made to the Registrar of the Joint Stock 
Companies twice a year or on request. 
  It may well be that the provisions of this act put into the form of statute what the best practice of 
company creation at common law had already prepared (Cooke, 1950), but still this act contained 
the very base of the company law that followed and it gave the company the structure which it still 
has.  
  Since the Joint Stock Companies Act joined incorporation with shareholders’ unlimited liability, 
new rules needed to be established for the case of bankruptcy of such body. The bankruptcy of a 
partnership passed trough the bankruptcy of the partners, the bankruptcy of an incorporated body 
with limited liability didn’t involve the shareholders at all, but the registered companies were nor 
one nor the other. 
  The  Companies’  Winding-up  Act,  which  applied  to  commercial  companies  incorporated  by 
Charter  or  Act  of  Parliament,  to  commercial  companies  privileged  by  Letters  Patent,  to  any 
company provisionally or completely registered, contained provisions for the new case. The act is 
very  comprehensive;  it  deals  with  companies’  bankruptcy  and  the  fraud  aspects  of  bankruptcy 
introducing the elements for the definition of directors’ liability and it states procedures in great 
detail. A few points are particularly important and need to be highlighted. According to this act: the 
bankruptcy of a company was similar to the bankruptcy of an individual and it didn’t imply the 
shareholders’ bankruptcy; the company itself could declare itself insolvent through its directors and 
it  could  start  a  bankruptcy  procedure;  proceedings  against  a  company  had  to  be  taken  in  the 
Bankruptcy Court and assignees of the assets could apply to Chancery’s Court for a winding-up 
order. The execution against shareholders needed the sanction of Chancery Court and execution 
against shareholders could not be levied if the Chancery court had already issued an order to call on 
them. The subsidiary liability of the shareholders was to become effective accordingly to the Court 
of Chancery decision. 
  The  Joint  Stock  Companies  Act  and  the  Companies  Winding-up  Act  provide  the  general 
framework  of  company  law  in  the  mid-forties.  Their  relevance  wasn’t  determined  only  by  the 
definition of their application field, but was determined as well by the interaction with other statutes 
passed in the same and in the following year. 
  As I have shown, the Joint Stock Companies Act didn’t apply to railways but that only meant, 
that  these  companies  wouldn’t  have  been  incorporated  when  the  registration  process  was 
completed.  Railways  companies  needed  to  follow  the  registration  procedure,  before  they  could 
apply  for  the  private  legislation,  which  would  have  incorporated  them  in  the  end.  Railways 
companies were then subject to the registration process that wasn’t sufficient for incorporation, but 
was  necessary  to  establish  the  company  by  private  act.  The  railway  sector  for  it’s  enormous 
importance in terms of resources it needed and collected, for the profits it could generate, and for 
the legal implications its development had
21, was subject to a specific legislation. I won’t analyse at 
this  point  legislation  governing  the  railways  companies,  but  a  couple  of  points  are  worthy 
mentioning. The establishment of railways companies was subject to The Railways Regulation Act 
f,  passed  in  July  1844.  This  act,  containing  common  rules  for  the  establishment  of  railways 
companies, not only kept their incorporation under State control but in fact extended the scrutiny of 




21 Railways companies needed the special power to buy land, but to give to the railways companies the power to buy or 
expropriate land was interfering with land property rights (Kostal, 1994).
 
22 The Railways Regulation Act contained amongst the other provision that the State could assess the profitability of the 
railways companies and accordingly it could change the rates that companies were paying. Furthermore the State could 
buy railways companies twenty one years after they obtained their charter.
  
 
   
 
  Banks, like railways, were excluded from the Joint Stock Companies Act and the banking sector 
with its speciality connected to the issue of notes and to the special status of the Bank of England 
was regulated by special legislation. The establishment of a bank was subject to concession of 
Letters  Patent.  Nonetheless  the  Joint  Stock  Bank  Act  of  1844  brought  the  banks  under  the 
prescriptions of the Companies’ Winding-up Act. The establishment of banks was regulated by 
special legislation but their bankruptcy followed the rules of any other commercial company. 
  The process of homogenisation of company law was taken a further step forward in 1845 when 
the  Companies’  Clause  Consolidation  Act
g  and  the  Railways  Clauses  Consolidation  Act
h  were 
passed. The objective of both acts was to provide a set of common rules that were to apply to all 
companies needing incorporation by special act. The establishment of common rules had many 
consequences and among the other I mention that the special legislation was to be simpler because 
single provisions could be replaced with references to statute, a whole class of companies could be 
regulated by  changes in the statute and finally  companies shared a common and uniform legal 
status. 
  As I have shown a comprehensive reform of company’s law has taken place by the mid 1840’s. 
If the general framework and the principles underlying the various act can only be seen a step 
forward in the development of company law, the provisions contained in the various acts were far 
from perfect. In some case the acts had consequences that were the exact opposite of what was 
intended and their weakness were soon to become evident. 
  The Joint Stock Companies Act imposed  registration as  a first necessary  step to  establish a 
company and above all, provisional registration was a prerequisite for a company’s promotion. This 
rule imposing a well-defined publicity regime for companies’ promotions was clearly trying to give 
the public the necessary information to correctly distinguish between bona fide promotions and 
frauds. Unfortunately the act only created a publicity regime and didn’t go to the core of the issue: 
what was the legal status of a promoted company and what was the relationship between promoters, 
members  of  the  formations’  committee  and  the  subscribers  (shareholders  to  be  upon  complete 
incorporation).  
  The development of the “railway mania” of 1845-46 and its consequences clearly highlights this 
point. By that time, existing railways companies proved to be extremely successful and profitable as 
the provision of the Railways Regulation Act about companies’ dividends and rates shows. The 
public benefit to the economy  connected with the development of these infrastructures and the 
private benefit to the shareholders connected with profitability made railways companies in high 
demand for their services and their shares. The new legislation giving apparently clear rules about 
companies’ promotion possibly dispelled the shadows of the previous bubbles and a huge wave of 
company promotions took place. According to government data (reported by Todd, 1932) by late 
1845 there were about a thousand registered companies and by the same time there were 1,200 
provisionally  registered  railways  (Levi,  1870).  Letting  aside  the  apparently  numerous  cases  of 
illegal promotions, this wave of perfectly legitimate and regulated companies’ promotion followed 
the  well  established  pattern  of  issue  and  trade  in  companies’  scripts  and  when  the  bubble  did 
collapse the limits the new legislation became clear. There were no provisions dealing with the 
liability of promoters, script-holders and original subscribers towards creditors, and there were no 
provisions dealing with the liability of promoters, script-holders and original subscribers toward 
each-others.  
  The Winding-up Act, despite being very detailed, put the winding–up of a company under the 
authority  of  both  the  Court  of  Chancery  and  the  Bankruptcy  Court.  The  result  of  having  two 
different authorities in charge of the winding-up process was a conflict amongst the two and that 
made the process cumbersome and inefficient. According to this same act, shareholders couldn’t 
start the winding-up process and since they were carrying unlimited liability for the company debt, 
they had little protection from management wrongdoing: shareholders had no way to cut their losses  
 
   
by winding-up their company. This and other shortcomings of the act were amended by two later 
acts: the Winding-up Act of 1848
i and the Winding-up Act of 1849
j.  
  The first of these two acts gave the shareholders right to apply to the Court of Chancery for the 
winding-up of their company upon the happening of some events as wide as “… if any other matter 
of thing can be shown which, in the opinion of the Court shall render it just and equitable that the 
company should be dissolved”. According to this act, publicity was prescribed for the winding-up 
procedure and the powers of the Court of Chancery were extended. The core problem of having two 
different authorities in charge of the process wasn’t solved and it was possibly made worst by 
having now the shareholders that could promote the winding-up of the company in competition with 
the creditors. 
  The second of these two acts contains a few amendments to the Winding-up Act of 1848, but 
above all it brings under that act all partnerships, association and companies of more than six people 
whenever formed with the exceptions of railways and some mining companies. By this act the 
winding-up of any type of company was substantially regulated by a single set of rules. 
 
4.  ONE SMALL STEP FOR THE DRAFTER BUT ONE GIANT LEAP FOR COMPANY 
LAW?  
In this paragraph I describe how the benefit of liability limitation was introduced. The introduction 
of the “limited liability” formula was the last step in the definition of the company status we are 
familiar with and made incorporation freely available to anybody. At this stage incorporation was 
an administrative process that generated a standardised legal status. Joint economic activities run for 
profit were now regulated by law and not by a case by case intervention of the State. 
  The changes in company law of the mid and late eighteen-forties weren’t sufficient to reach a 
stable framework and in the early eighteen-fifties there was intense parliamentary activity aiming at 
improving the situation. Three different parliamentary committees dealt with the issue of company 
law from different points of view: the Selected Committee on Investment and Savings of the Middle 
and Working Classes, which reported in 1850, the Selected Committee on the Law of Partnership, 
which reported in 1851, and the Royal Mercantile Law Commission which reported in 1854. These 
parliamentary works provided the background for the preparation of the Limited Liability Act
k, 
passed on 14
th of August 1855.  
  The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 allowed companies to be incorporated without the incident 
of limited liability by simply filing with the office of the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies 
certain information and by paying a fee. The Limited Liability Act gave companies the right to 
obtain incorporation with limited liability at the end of the registration process subject to their 
choice and the fulfilment of a few requisites or it could be said imposing few restrictions. A new 
company could obtain incorporation with limited liability provided that: in the application for the 
registration it was stated that the company was to have limited liability, the word “limited” was 
attached to the name, the liability’s limit was stated in the deed of settlement, the deed of settlement 
had been signed by at least 25 shareholders holding at least 75% of the nominal capital and having 
paid up at least 20% of the capital, the shares had a nominal value of at least £10 and at least one of 
the  appointed  auditors  was  approved  by  the  Board  of  Trade.
23  Companies  which  were  already 
registered  under  the  act  of  1844,  with  the  exception  of  insurance  companies  and  companies 
incorporated  by  Private  Act,  could  obtain  incorporation  with  limited  liability  according  to  the 
Limited Liability Act if: a qualified majority of 75% of the shareholders, in number and by capital, 
agreed to change the company’s name, the deed of settlement and the share’s nominal value as 
requested by the 1855 act; and if an audit of the company’s account by a person appointed by the 
Board of Trade had shown the company to be solvent.
24 
_____________________ 
23 The same act made directors fully liable for loans made to shareholders and fully liable for the company’s debt, if 
they declared and paid dividends when the company was known to be insolvent.
 
24 The rights of creditors at the date when the limited liability certificate was obtained were unaffected by the change in  
company’s status.  
 
   
 
Under the Limited liability Act 1855, limitation of liability was a limit to the execution against 
shareholders.  Limited liability meant that execution against a shareholder could not  exceed the 
unpaid part of a share and it could only be taken in default of the company and by order of the 
Court. It’s worthy noticing that shareholders were still liable towards the company’s creditors. 
Companies registered with limited liability were subjected to compulsory winding-up in accordance 
with  the  Winding-up  Acts  of  1844,  1848  and  1849,  if  the  audited  accounts  showed  that  three 
quarters of the subscribed capital had been lost. 
  The principle of limited liability was introduced by a short act that made only a few changes to 
the  registration  process  and  set  a  few  restrictions  to  obtaining  the  liability’s  limit:  to  have  a 
minimum size, to have approved auditors and to be subject to compulsory winding-up. The Limited 
Liability  Act kept however the registration process as it was in 1844 allowing provisional and 
complete registration and the benefit of limited liability was to be achieved only after complete 
registration. In this respect this act didn’t bring much improvement, since it let open the problem of 
liability for the provisionally registered companies. The pros and cons of this act didn’t have time to 
come to light because the act had a very short life, being repealed in 1856. 
  In February 1856 Parliament passed the Joint Stock Companies Act
l. This act didn’t bring any 
change  to  the  legal  form  that  joint  stock  enterprise  could  choose,  but  it’s  provisions  gave  to 
company law not only the structure it still has but a shape which was almost unchanged for the 
following half a century. 
  This act repealed the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited Liability Act of 1855. 
According  to  the  new  act  the  registration  process  was  now  a  single  step  one,  and  provisional 
registration didn’t take place any more. The benefit of limited liability was reached as soon as the 
company  came  into  existence  and  this  clearly  removed  the  problem  of  the  legal  status  for 
provisionally  registered  (and  possibly  promoted)  companies.  Associations  of  more  than  seven 
people  could  register  themselves  as  companies  by  filing  not  a  deed  of  settlement  but  a 
memorandum of association signed by the subscribers and filing the articles of association. The act 
provided the form for the memorandum of association and in its schedules a default template for the 
articles of association. A company was incorporated when the memorandum of association was 
registered.  
  Companies registered under the 1844 act had to register under this act within three months. 
Other companies legally established having more than seven partners were allowed to register under 
the 1856 act. If these companies wanted to change their liability regime from unlimited to limited, 
the change had to be approved by three-quarter of the shareholders in number and by value. The 
deed  of  settlement,  Royal  Charter,  Letters  Patens  and  the  by-laws  of  these  already  existing 
companies, were to be recognised by this act.  
Partnerships  of  more  that  twenty  members  could  not  legally  carry  on  their  business  without 
registering as companies under this act if they had profit as main objective. On the other side, if the 
membership of company registered under this act with limited liability was to fall under seven 
partners the company would loose the benefit of the limited liability or it could be wind-up by the 
Court. 
  The provisions of this act didn’t apply to banks and insurance companies. 
  Part II of the act gave provisions about the relationship between management and shareholders, 
making clearer the powers of the directors versus the powers of the meeting of the shareholders. 
Part III of the act gives provisions for the winding-up of the company. The Winding-up acts of 
1844, 1848 and 1849 didn’t apply to the companies registered under this act nor to companies 
registered under the act of 1844 and re-registered under the act of 1856. The power to wind-up a 
company were transferred from the Court of Chancery to the Court of Bankruptcy which was now 
the sole authority and the company could now wind-up itself without any intervention of the courts. 
Under this act, calls on shareholders were treated as debt toward the company. Shareholders ceased 
to be liable toward the company’s creditor and became liable only toward the company.  
 
   
  The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 by repealing the acts of 1844 and 1855 and by changing 
the registration process brought few but important changes to company law. This act removed some 
of the restrictions in forming a limited liability company: the registration process was a simpler one, 
the limit of at least twenty-five shareholders to establish a company was replaced with the limit of 
just seven, any limit to shares nominal value and paid-up part was as well removed as it was the 
need to appoint an approved auditor. No limit was put for loans to shareholders and if three-quarters 
of the nominal capital were lost, winding-up was possible but not mandatory. The removal of these 
limits was accompanied by an increase in the information about the company’s capital and the 
shareholders that companies had to file annually with the Office of the Registrar, and by an increase 
in publicity of the company’s legal status. Information about the company’s accounts was instead 
made less accessible to shareholders and to the public in general. 
  The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 was slightly amended shortly after, by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act
m of 1857. This act removed the requisite of a minimum of seven members for a 
registered company and it removed compulsory conversion of partnerships with more than twenty 
partners into companies.
25 The same act introduced penalties for companies that failed to register 
under the 1856 Act and allowed a few capital changes like converting fully paid shares into stock 
and selling part of the company’s properties in exchange for shares in another company during 
voluntary winding-up. 
  With the Acts of 1855, 1856 and 1857, company law had enacted most of the principles that still 
govern it. The limited liability company was well defined in its character and in its features. The 
limited  liability  company  wasn’t  yet  a  universal  model  for  associations  run  for  profit,  but  its 
establishment was clearly regulated and almost completely free from State interference.  
According to Formoy (1923, pp.114) the introduction of limited liability is “the most important part 
of the evolution of joint stock companies”, B. C. Hunt (1969) quotes from the Economist 1855 a 
different opinion: “never, perhaps, was a change so vehemently and generally demanded, of which 
the importance was so much overrated”, and C.A. Cooke (1950) quotes, from 1856 sources, that the 
limited liability legislation was hastily introduced by the government just to show that it was doing 
something beside asking money for the Crimean War. It’s perhaps impossible to give a clear-cut 
judgement of the relevance of the introduction of limited liability; nonetheless it’s hard to deny that 
it was the last step that brought company law into its modern shape. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have resumed the development of company law from 1720 through to 1857. During 
this long period of time, company law assumed the characteristics it has now.  
  At the starting point when I start my analysis, company law stood with incorporation granted by 
the  Crown  or  Parliament  on  one  side  and  partnership  regulated  by  common  law  on  the  other. 
Incorporation was a legal form that wasn’t specific to business companies and it was tailored to 
measure for every application. That made incorporation expensive to achieve and a very varied 
legal status. Companies applying for incorporation were granted a rather wide and complex set of 
legal  attributes,  including  limited  liability,  and  each  charter  defined  the  legal  status  of  each 
corporation, according to what was needed and to what was seen as necessary. When considering 
this process of incorporation it should be noticed that not only it would produces a wide range of 
legal forms, but that such process creates a problem of selection. Parliament or the Crown had to 
solve not only the problem of assessing each applications but to assess competing applications as 
well  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  railways,  companies  developing  competing  projects  applied  for 
incorporation  and  it  was  for  the  State  select  the  deserving  one).  The  process  of  granting 
incorporation by the State was not only expensive for the applicants, not only it was generating a 
very wide spectrum of legal bodies but it was difficult and expensive to administer as well. As far 
as economic associations are concerned, the process of incorporation by the State was then slowly 
_____________________ 
25 If a partnership had more than twenty members, each single partner was to be liable for the whole partnership’s debit 
without joinder of any other partner.  
 
   
 
amended and eventually it was abandoned when incorporation, with or without limited liability, was 
made freely available. 
  Partnership was a common law legal form that proved rather ineffective to run modern firms. 
Just to recall one major problem, I mention here the difficulties to start legal proceedings by a 
partnership or by a third party against it. Crown, Parliament and later the Board of Trade were given 
the  power  to  grant  companies  legal  incidents  that  allowed  them  to  work  more  efficiently.  The 
incidents of incorporation that were more useful were granted to companies through a process that 
became simpler through time.  
  The last step in the development of company law was to produce a definition of incorporation 
that was suitable for associations born for with an economic objective an to made this form of 
incorporation freely available. It wasn’t anymore the State to select the best legal form to run a 
business but it was for the enterprise to adopt the legal form that best suited it. 
This long development of company law needed a process of definition of what are the problems 
connected to the fact a firm is run in association and what is the legal framework that allow to solve 
efficiently with the lowest costs these problems. The same company liability needed to be defined 
and an effective way to partition it, needed to be found. It’s true that direct, ad hoc legislation, and 
very detailed and complex contracts, to be eventually tested in court, could mimic the whole set of 
features that characterize the modern limited liability company and these law and contracts could 
solve all the problems arising from the fact that an economic activity is run in an associated form, 
but such institutional arrangement imply very high costs for all contracting parts and the ability on 
their side to foresee all possible contingencies. The long and complex development of company law 
can be seen as a process of reduction of the very high costs otherwise connected to running an 
enterprise  in  association  form.  When  studying  the  introduction  of  limited  liability  it  should  be 
remembered that the introduction of this limitation gets its meaning from the exact definition of 
many  other  aspects  of  company  life,  e.g.  bankruptcy  procedures,  directors’  power  and 
responsibility, shareholders rights, publicity regime for company acts. 
  
 
   
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
G. G. Acheson, J. D. Turner, 2004, The impact of limited liability on ownership and control: Irish 
banking 1877-1914, School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University of Belfast, Belfast 
(UK), mimeo. 
C. E. Amsler, R. L. Bartlett, C. J. Bolton, 1981, Thoughts of some British economists on early 
limited liability and corporate legislation, History of Political Economy,13: pp.774-793. 
G.  J.  Benston,  1976,  Corporate  financial  disclosure  in  the  UK  and  USA,  Saxon  House, 
Farnborough, (U.K.).  
H. N .Butler, 1986, General incorporation in nineteenth century England: interaction of common 
law and legislative processes International Review of Law and Economics, 6:169-187. 
J. L. Carr, G. F. Matthewson, 1988, Unlimited liability as barrier to entry, The Journal of Political 
Economy, 96:766-784. 
C.  A.  Cooke,  1950,  Corporation  trust  and  company,  Manchester  University  Press,  Manchester 
(UK). 
S. R. Cope, 1978, The stock exchange revisited: a new look at the market in securities in London in 
the eighteenth century, Economica, 45:1-21. 
A.B. Dubois,1971, The English business company after the Bubble Act 1720-1800, Octagon Books, 
New York (USA). 
F. H. Easterbrook, D. R. Fischel, 1985, Limited liability and the corporation, The University of 
Chicago Law Review , 52: 89 – 117. 
F. Evans, 1908 [a], Evolution of the English joint stock limited trading company, Columbia Law 
Review, VIII: 339-361. 
F. Evans, 1908 [b], Evolution of the English joint stock limited trading company  Columbia Law 
Review, VIII :461-480. 
J. H. Farrar, N. E. Furey, B. M. Hanningan , 1991, Farrar’s company law  (3
rd edition) , Butterwoth 
& Co Publishers Ltd, London (UK). 
K. F. Forbes, 1986, Limited liability and the development of business corporation, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation, 2: 163-177. 
R.  R.  Formoy,  1923,  The  historical  foundations  of  modern  company  law,  Sweet  and  Maxwell 
Limited, London (UK). 
P. M. Garber, 1990, Famous first bubbles, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.4 n.2, Spring. 
L. C. B. Gower, 1979, Gower’s principles of modern company law (4
th Edition), Stevens & Sons, 
London UK. 
P. Z. Grossmann, 1995, The market for shares of companies with unlimited liability: the case of 
American Express, Journal of Legal Studies, XXIV: 63 – 85. 
P. L. Davies, 1997, Gower’s principles of modern company law” (6
th Edition), Sweet & Maxwell, 
London UK. 
P.Halpern, M.Trebilcock, S.Turnbull, 1980, An economic analysis of limited liability in corporation 
law, The University of Toronto Law Journal , 30: 117 – 150. 
C.  R.  Hickson,  J.  D.  Turner,  2005,  Shareholder  liability  regimes  in  nineteenth-century  English 
banking: the impact upon the market for shares, European Review of Economic History, 42: 459-
476. 
C. R. Hickson, J. D. Turner, C. McCann, 2003, Much ado about nothing: the limitation of liability 
and the market for 19
th century Irish bank stock, Explorations in Economic History, 7: 99-125 
W. Holdsworth, A history of English law” (17 vols.), Mathuen & Co Ltd., London (UK), various 
years. 
W. Horrwitz, 1946, Historical development of company law, The Law Quarterly Review, 62: 375-
386. 
B. C. Hunt, 1969, The development of the business corporation in England 1800-1867 – Russel & 
Russel, New York, (USA).   
 
   
B.  C.  Hunt,  1935,  The  Joint-Stock  company  in  England  1800-1825,  The  Journal  of  Political 
Economy, 43: 1-33.  
R. W. Kostal, 1994, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(UK). 
L.  Levi,  1870,  On  Joint  Stock  Companies,  Statistical  Journal,  Journal  of  the  Royal  Statistical 
Society, XXXIII : 1-41. 
A . H. Manchester, 1980,  Modern Legal History, Butterworths, London U.K. 
R. C. Michie, 1999, The London Stock Exchange: a history, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK). 
M. Patterson, D. Reiffen, 1990, The effect of the Bubble Act on the market for joint stock shares, 
The Journal of Economic History, L: 163-171.  
R.  R.  Pennington,  1993,  Company  law”  (Sixth  edition),  Butterworths  &  Co(Publishers)  Ltd, 
London (UK). 
M. S Rix, 1945, Company Law: 1844 and To-Day, The Economic Journal , 55: 242-260. 
W. R. Scott, 1912, The constitution and finance of English, Scottish and Irish joint stock companies 
to 1720 (3 vols.), Cambridge (UK),. 
H. A. Shannon, 1931, The coming of general limited liability, Economic History (supplement of 
Economic Journal) Jan. pp.267-291. 
M. Smart, 1996, On limited liability and the development of capital markets: an historical analysis, 
Department  of  Economics  and  Institute  for  Policy  Analysis,  University  of  Toronto,  Toronto 
(Canada), Working Paper n.UT-ECIPA-SMART-96-02. 
W. Smart, 1917, Economic Annals of the nineteenth century 1821-1830, vol.II, Macmillan and Co, 
Lts, London (UK). 
G. Todd, 1932, Some aspects of joint stock companies 1844-1900, The economic History Review, 4:  
46-71. 
M. I. Weinstein, 2003, Share price changes and the arrival of limited liability in California, Journal 
of Legal Studies, 32: 1-25. 
A. Winston, 1993, Limitation of liability and the ownership structure of the firm, The Journal of 
Finance, 48: 487-512. 
S.  Woodward,  1985,  Limited  liability  and  the  theory  of  the  firm,  Zeitshrift  fuer  die  gesammte 
Staatswissenschaft, 141: 601-611. 
 
STATUTES CITED 
a) 1720 Bubble Act, 6 Geo.I, c.18. 
b) 1825 Bubble Companies Etc. Act, 6 Geo.IV, c.91
 
c) 1834 Trading Companies Act, 4/5 Wm IV, c.94
 
d) 1837 Chartered Companies Act 7 Will. IV & I Vict. c 73   
e) 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act 7 & 8 Vict. c 110 
f) 1844 Railways Regulation Act 7 & 8 Vict. c 85  
 
g) 1845 Companies’ Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c.16
 
h) 1845 Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c.20
 
i) 1848 Joint Stock Companies Winding-up Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c.45
 
j) 1849 Joint Stock Companies Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c.108 
k) 1855 Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c.133 
l) 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act, 19 & 20 Vict. c.47
 
m) 1857 Joint Stock Companies Act,20 & 21 Vict. c.14 
 